docs(skill+plan): real-not-paper entry self-coverage principle

Skill section B: entry counts as self-covered only when its runtime check
hard-fails on its own bytes; check integrityCoverageSelfVerified; keep
host-trust values inside covered artifacts. STATE/CHANGELOG/design note
record the 2026-11-05 CrackMe v8 round (NO PRIZE, REA unverified).
This commit is contained in:
qybaihe
2026-11-05 10:08:24 +08:00
parent b5a90cce03
commit cd218dcc21
4 changed files with 8 additions and 1 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Also: do **not** ship a stable public WASM ABI without explicit `wasm_preserve_e
- Sensitive literals in panel.html / license.cjs must not remain cleartext in shipped artifacts; prefer `bla_encrypt_strings` (seed-derived XOR — never JS AES wrap-key). Lint with `bla_lint_plaintext_secrets`.
- Integrity checkers must be interleaved and mutually covering (coverage matrix `bla-integrity-coverage/v1`); single-point self-seal is refuse-worthy. Lint with `bla_lint_integrity_coverage`.
- Coverage claims must be real, not paper: an entry may only count as covering itself when its runtime check hard-fails on its own bytes (canonical self-digest, finalized at write). Check `integrityCoverageSelfVerified` on the harden report; when false the matrix drops self edges and refuses. Keep host-trust values (e.g. certificate digests) inside a covered artifact — unhardened data sidecars like `seal.json` are not covered.
Held across R8–R12 (NO PRIZE). Keep in gate design; do **not** invent packaging refuse lints for these:
+1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- **Self-seal entry self-digest (CrackMe v8 red team 2026-11-05):** the self-seal measure now embeds a canonical SHA-256 of the entry file (all digest literals zeroed) finalized at the protector's write chokepoint, so editing or appending to the entry itself hard-fails with `integrity check failed` instead of only shifting the opaque digest. Un-finalized snippets soft-skip (never brick). `hardenProject` reports `integrityCoverageSelfVerified`; when the on-disk entry does not verify, `integrity-coverage.json` drops `host#site*` → host self edges (honest refuse) rather than claiming paper coverage.
- **seal-commitment lint:** new warnings `public-materialization-seed` and `public-key-digest-oracle` (CrackMe v8 red-team exposures) surface via `bla lint` / `bla_lint`. Warning only — not bankrupt refuse.
- **CrackMe v8 Aegis:** product entitlement challenge rebuilt with bla-agents **2.0** (`bankrupt` + `--self-seal`, no `--allow-*`). Absorbs red/blue R1–R12 recipes (SHA-256(key) mask KDF, commitment outside XOR, seed-derived rounds/pad3, arity-2 / export-order / unlock body-index hygiene). Meridian v7 remains a historical snapshot (cleartext private; not re-hardened).
+5 -1
View File
@@ -91,10 +91,14 @@ Outside the repo, `npm pack` → install tarball → isolated `HOME`:
Unified `bla lint` / MCP `bla_lint` (`bla-packaging-gates/v1`) aggregates every bankrupt refuse lint from red-blue rounds 1–7; R8–R12 SHA-256 KDF / commitment-outside-XOR / arity+export hygiene live as Skill recipes + WASM protect defaults. Honesty residual: full WASM RE + online/SMT — **not** a new refuse lint. Skill **v2.0.0**. Shipped as **bla-agents 2.0.0** (PR #77).
## Post-2.0 continuous hardening (2026-11-05)
CrackMe v8 red team (round-20261105): **NO PRIZE** — key/FLAG not recovered; `redteam:rea` **unverified** (REA dist absent). Last round's public-seed KP and `keySha256` oracle verified closed by harness. New exposure (empirical tamper matrix, not REA): entry `license.cjs` self-tamper was undetected although the coverage matrix claimed `license.cjs#siteN → license.cjs` (paper coverage). Fixed by canonical entry self-digest + `integrityCoverageSelfVerified` honesty downgrade. Residual: unhardened `seal.json` data sidecar not covered (not a prize — public `flagSha256` is the proof); bankrupt `plaintext-secret` lint flags BLA's own decoy literals (false positive, not exploitable). Shipped `challenge/v8` artifacts predate PRs #84–86 + this fix (rebuild needs release secrets).
## Nightly roadmap remaining
1. ~~**Self-seal / defenseScore honesty (#40)**~~ — landed soft-caps + opt-in `--self-seal` / MCP `self_seal` / `.blarc selfSeal` (batch 2026-11-02). Remaining: deeper onefile/peel score model.
2. **Sidecar entry entanglement** — DESIGN + `planSidecarEntanglement()` stub landed; full strip⇒fail rewrite still open.
2. **Sidecar entry entanglement** — DESIGN + `planSidecarEntanglement()` stub landed; self-seal entry self-digest (edit⇒fail on the entry itself) landed 2026-11-05; full strip⇒fail rewrite still open.
3. **Deception shields → more formats** — WASM export rename + `wasmPreserveExports` landed; DEX/SQLite/model densify and broader numeric template hygiene still open.
4. **Empirical JADX / Android red-team** — real REA mapping+JNI vs BLA-hardened unsigned APK.
5. **ESP flash / esp-image (#8228)** — if REA moved there; UF2 empirical red-team otherwise.
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ checks beat orphan honeypot files.
## Follow-ups
- ~~Entry self-coverage~~ — landed 2026-11-05: self-seal embeds a canonical entry self-digest finalized at write time; harden reports `integrityCoverageSelfVerified` and drops paper self edges when it does not verify.
- Wire planner into `protectTarget` for JS + Python when `sidecarEntangle` is set.
- Extend to ASAR / Bun snapshot / native companion files.
- Honesty: when entanglement is off, defenseScore gap annotation (like self-seal).