feat: ship-ready agent journey, shield equivalence, honest reports — v3.5.0
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BLA: Blind LLM Agents
Poison → Exhaust → Hallucinate. Make Reverse Engineering Bankrupt Again.
The open-source Counter-REA Blue Defense MCP & CLI that protects software releases against AI reverse-engineering agents (morluto/rea, autonomous decompilers, and LLM recon pipelines) — verified across 14 showcase benchmark targets.
🌐 Official Website · 📖 Defense Guides · 📊 Live Benchmarks · 🎯 CrackMe Arena · 🏢 Enterprise · ⚖️ Disclaimer
Quick Start · How It Works · Empirical Results · Format Coverage · 14-Target Benchmark · CrackMe Arena · FAQ
Important
Defensive Use Only: BLA is engineered strictly for software authors and security teams protecting their own intellectual property and release artifacts. See DISCLAIMER.md. Always install from official sources: qybaihe/bla or
npm i bla-agents.
🔴 Without BLAAI reverse-engineering agents ( |
🛡️ With BLA (
|
⚡ Runtime-Equivalent by DesignExhaustion graphs and decoy payloads sit behind |
⚡ 30-Second Quick Start
1. One-Command CLI Hardening
Point BLA at any project or release directory. It auto-discovers build outputs (dist/, build/, .asar, .wasm, .sqlite, .safetensors, native binaries, Python/C/Rust/Go) and runs audit → protect → verify:
# Node.js ^22.23.4 or >=24.0.0 recommended
npx bla-agents harden . # writes a partial mirror to .bla-hardened/ — nothing ships yet
npx bla-agents harden . --apply # ship it: replace the build output with the hardened files
npx bla-agents harden . --restore # undo: put the original build output back
Build first — harden targets what your build produced and leaves the toolchain alone. --apply only overwrites build output (never source) and keeps the originals outside the project; run your own tests against the promoted build before releasing.
2. Agent-Driven Closed-Loop Defense (MCP + Skill)
Register BLA once with your coding agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, VS Code, OpenCode, Antigravity):
npx bla-agents setup
Then simply prompt your coding agent:
Harden my software against REA
Your host agent automatically orchestrates BLA's MCP tools (bla_weave_plan → source-level logic weaving & string encryption → bla_verify_weave → bla_harden → bla_verify) to harden both your source architecture and compiled artifacts. Every result carries nextSteps, so the agent finishes the job: it asks before promoting the hardened files over the build output (apply), then runs your tests.
3. Build Bundler Plugin (Vite / Rollup / Webpack / esbuild)
Protect JS chunks, strip/replace SourceMaps with VLQ v3 honey maps, and shield .wasm assets automatically at bundle time:
import { defineConfig } from "vite";
import { blaVitePlugin } from "bla-agents/bundler";
export default defineConfig({
plugins: [blaVitePlugin({ intensity: "bankrupt", enableHoneySourceMaps: true })],
});
🧠 How BLA Works: Agent-Driven Closed Loop
Traditional obfuscators only rename variables (_0x1a2b), which modern LLMs effortlessly summarize, or wrap binaries in heavy VM packers that break cross-platform builds and degrade performance.
BLA 3.x combines format-native deterministic shields with host-agent surgical source weaving:
flowchart LR
subgraph S1["1 · Recon & Plan"]
A["bla_audit / bla_lint"] --> B["bla_weave_plan"]
end
subgraph S2["2 · Agent Source Surgery"]
B --> C["bla_encrypt_strings\n(AST Span XOR + Keystream)"]
C --> D["bla_bind_scope\n(Multi-Site State Entanglement)"]
D --> E["bla_verify_weave"]
end
subgraph S3["3 · Artifact Shielding"]
E --> F["bla_harden / bla_defend\n(19+ Format Shields + Self-Seal)"]
end
subgraph S4["4 · Counter-REA Gate"]
F --> G["bla_verify\n(Structural Counter-REA Checks Only)"]
end
| Defense Pillar | Mechanism | Effect on AI Reverse-Engineering Agents |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Poison (Deception) | Plants format-valid canaries, SGX/TPM2/Secure Enclave delegation manifests, VLQ v3 honey SourceMaps, and plausible shadow state machines. | Forces LLM agents to split context across conflicting hypotheses and chase synthetic rabbit holes. |
| 2. Exhaust (Budget Breakers) | Trips the analyzer's default limits (primitive-candidates, alias-selections, ASAR 16 MiB header, WASM Wabt representation, SQLite virtual column eval, Model 32-level nesting, PCAP tshark field pass (fixed 8 MiB), Electron 32 fuse sentinels). |
Downgrades REA's default examination from COMPLETE to LIMITED / CapacityError. Where REA lets the caller raise a limit this costs the attacker a retry, not the analysis — see the last column of the results table. |
| 3. Entangle (Anti-Strip & Self-Seal) | Binds sibling artifacts (JS ↔ WASM ↔ Native sidecars) via runtime SHA-256 digests (--self-seal, --sidecar-entangle) and multi-site caller scope folding (bla_bind_scope). |
Prevents red-team agents from stripping decoys, nop-patching single-point checks, or calling exported functions as offline oracles. |
| 4. Runtime Truman Show | Hardens Electron V1 Fuses (RunAsNode=0, Inspect=0) and detects CDP / Node Inspector / Frida / WebDriver attachment (runtime-shield.ts). |
Serves believable synthetic telemetry during live debugging while keeping normal user execution untouched. |
🔬 Empirical Results vs. Real REA
These numbers come from running real morluto/rea against BLA-hardened samples on commodity hardware (npm run redteam:rea). Full machine-readable report: docs/redteam/empirical-rea-validation.md / .json.
How to read this: “Empirically verified” means the live REA analyzer path returned the listed budget / capacity / redaction failure in this environment. It is not a claim about Ghidra/Frida/LLDB/Rizin/JADX sessions we did not run here.
Most of REA's budgets are defaults the caller can raise. As of REA
05be423(2026-11-17) its limits are per-call inputs or settings, and REA's own error tells the agent which one to raise (asar.max_header_bytesup to 256 MiB,max_interface_bytesup to 512 MiB,max_chunks,semantic_precision). A ❌ below therefore means REA stops here as it runs by default: a size-based plant costs an attacker one retry, it does not lock REA out. The last column says which limits REA keeps fixed, and JavaScript strings is the one row measured with the budgets raised.
Empirically Verified on Commodity Hardware
Last recorded 2026-11-18 against REA 05be423 under Node v26.12.1 (macOS arm64) with Wabt 1.0.42 and tshark 4.4.1. REA analyses packet captures only on Linux / Windows, so on macOS the harness runs REA's two tshark passes, with the arguments read from REA's own provider, and hands their output to REA's parser. Soft-skips keep Node 22 / CI green when external native tools are absent; a probe that cannot call REA at all is reported as a harness error (status: unverified, exit 2), never as a budget hit.
| Format | Before → After | REA Outcome After BLA | Exact REA Budget / Error Triggered | Can the caller raise it? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go buildinfo | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ⚠️ Rejected as malformed | BinaryFormatFailure — Go build-info string range is truncated. REA reads no build info from the hardened file, but it now checks the string range before max_build_info_bytes (1 MiB), the budget this plant was sized for |
Not measured |
| Erlang BEAM | 84 B → 241 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | max_chunks — BEAM form exceeds the 64-chunk budget |
Yes — max_chunks |
| EVM bytecode | 16 B → 4.00 MiB | ⚠️ Admitted, just under the cap | 4,190,208 of 4,194,304 bytes of EVM_PRODUCER_LIMIT_DEFAULTS.input_bytes; the EVMole worker itself is not run by the harness |
Yes — producer_limits.input_bytes |
| PCAP | 24 B → 1.91 MiB | ❌ Budget rejected | REA asks tshark for 25 selected fields and holds that output to the 8 MiB TSHARK_JSON_MAX_BYTES: the hardened capture prints 12.7 MiB, so inspect_pcap_capture fails with a non-retryable resource error. Ten DNS responses do it — 4,076 answers each, every one naming a 251-character owner through a 2-byte compression pointer, which tshark prints in full. Without them REA read the 160 other decoys (116 KiB) |
No — fixed; REA has no setting for it |
| Electron ASAR | 607 B → 16.9 MiB | ❌ Capacity error | DEFAULT_ASAR_MAX_HEADER_BYTES (16 MiB) |
Yes — asar.max_header_bytes, up to 256 MiB |
| WASM + Wabt | 54 B → 6.56 MiB · 251 exports | ⚠️ ifaceState=partial |
max_interface_bytes (32 MiB) — Typed WASM interface representation exceeds max_interface_bytes |
Yes — up to 512 MiB |
SQLite (Node 24, --sqlite-eval-trap) |
12 KiB → 56 KiB | ❌ Eval trap on the honey tables | SqliteColumnEvaluationFailure — unknown enclave_unseal_payload() on virtual trap columns. Opt-in (the default through 3.4.3): it also stops the application's own PRAGMA integrity_check / VACUUM. Default hardening adds honey tables REA can read; application tables are never hidden. |
Not a budget — an evaluation failure |
| JavaScript | 761 B → 153 KiB | ❌ Budget rejected | alias-selections + getter-expansion + primitive-bytes + primitive-candidates |
Yes — semantic_precision |
| JavaScript strings | 340 B → 154 KiB | ✅ 0 of 3 known values in REA's result | An endpoint URL, an IPC channel and a SHA-256 digest, at 1× / 4× / 64× budgets; REA returns all three from the unhardened file. Through 3.4.3 the pieces were written in clear: REA listed the channel at its defaults and all three once the budgets were raised 4× | Raised here, to 64× |
| Safetensors | 128 B → 9.7 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | MODEL_JSON_NESTING — Safetensors JSON nesting exceeds 32 levels (HF-loadable; tensors intact) |
No — fixed at 32 |
| GGUF | 24 B → 7.3 KiB | ❌ Capacity error | MODEL_METADATA_NESTING — GGUF metadata nesting exceeds 32 array frames |
No — fixed at 32 |
| Electron fuses | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ❌ Budget rejected | ELECTRON_FUSE_LIMITS.maximumSentinelsPerSlice (>32) |
No — fixed at 32 |
| Flutter pool | 50 KiB → 1.17 MiB | ⚠️ Projected cap | MAX_POOL_URIS / MAX_POOL_TOKENS (REA truncates with “at least N”) |
Yes — uri_limit / token_limit |
Reproduce locally:
export REA_WABT_BIN_DIRECTORY=$HOME/opt/wabt-1.0.42/bin # optional
npm run build && npm run redteam:rea
npm run verify:rea checks BLA's catalogue of REA limits against the same checkout (74 checks at 05be423) and says which of them are per-call defaults.
Designed-for paths not empirically run on this machine (click to expand)
These shields exist in-tree and are covered by unit tests / catalog drift checks, but the matching REA path requires external native debuggers/decompilers not installed on the CI runner:
| Area | Why Unverified Here |
|---|---|
| Ghidra / native decompilation depth | Requires a local Ghidra install + REA bridge |
| Frida / LLDB / GDB / Rizin live sessions | Requires those debuggers + device/process attach |
| JADX / full Android APK pipeline | APK resigning unsupported; standalone DEX shield is in-tree |
| Firmware containers | Staging/extraction budgets exist; no honest E2E without firmware corpora |
| SPIR-V / CUDA fatbinary / AMD GPU objects | Need native GPU object decoders; PTX text is shielded in-tree |
| EVMole in-process EVM decode | Not pathable in-process; EVM shield densifies to the 4 MiB input cap |
REA's own PCAP provider (inspect_pcap_capture) |
REA runs it only on Linux / Windows; on macOS the harness runs the same two tshark passes and REA's parser |
| Raised REA budgets, other than JavaScript strings | Not measured. Every other row is REA at its default settings |
🛡️ Format Coverage
All 26 format shields are built directly into bla-agents with zero external packer dependencies:
| Format | Canary + Diagnostic | Exhaustion / Budget Trip | Empirically vs. REA | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JavaScript / TypeScript | ✓ | ✓ semantic budgets | verified (in-process) | Babel AST; AST-safe string encryption; self-seal |
Electron .asar |
✓ | ✓ header 16 MiB | verified | IPC de-literalization + Pickle repackaging |
| Electron fuses | ✓ | ✓ >32 sentinels | verified | V1 fuse hardening + sentinel flood |
WebAssembly (.wasm) |
✓ custom sections | ✓ export decoys → Wabt | verified (Wabt) | LEB128 parser; preserves WebAssembly.validate |
SQLite (.sqlite / .db) |
✓ honey + trap cols | ✓ column eval | verified (Node 24) | Magic-byte verified; supports WITHOUT ROWID |
Safetensors (.safetensors) |
✓ string metadata | ✓ JSON nesting >32 | verified | HuggingFace-loadable; tensor bytes preserved |
GGUF (.gguf) |
✓ | ✓ ARRAY nesting >32 | verified | Preserves model weights and KV tensors |
| Go buildinfo (ELF) | ✓ | ✓ >1 MiB | verified (format rejection) | Mapped ELF section |
Windows PE (.exe / .dll) |
✓ | ✓ .enclave COFF section + fuses/rustc/Dart |
verified | Mapped .enclave section, x86-64 ABI function islands, MSVC RTTI, CodeView RSDS PDB |
| Flutter / Dart pool | ✓ | ✓ URI/token caps | verified (projected) | Snapshot magic & toolchain flood |
Erlang BEAM (.beam) |
✓ | ✓ chunks / atoms | verified | Exceeds 64-chunk budget |
| EVM + Solidity meta | ✓ | ✓ → 4 MiB input | verified (approach) | CBOR metadata + bytecode densification |
PCAP (.pcap) |
✓ | ✓ REA's tshark field pass > 8 MiB (fixed) | verified (tshark 4.4.1) | Synthetic packet + canary injection; a DNS answer flood at bankrupt |
Python (.py / .pyc) |
✓ | ✓ | designed-for | CPython 3.7–3.14 marshal & AST support |
NVIDIA PTX (.ptx) |
✓ | entry flood | benchmark only | Kernel entry & canary flood |
| DEX / IL2CPP / bplist / .NET / JVM / ZIP | ✓ | format-specific | designed-for | Recomputes DEX SHA-1 & Adler32 checksums |
📊 Benchmark (14 Targets, Internal Estimates)
Run npx bla-agents benchmark to execute the 14-target showcase locally:
npx bla-agents benchmark
Note: Token and USD columns below are internal estimates derived from BLA's catalog of REA limits to illustrate relative amplification across formats — for actual process-level REA errors, see the Empirical Results table above.
Aggregate Showcase Result: ~1,068.7× token amplification · ~503.5× cost amplification · 14/14 bundled showcase targets passed runtime-equivalence checks. This result is limited to the benchmark fixtures.
| Target Artifact | Unprotected Baseline (est.) | BLA Protected (est.) | Token Multiplier | Runtime Equivalence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
DX-Ball sound-pan (.js) |
84/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 2/100 · 15.2M tok · $238.02 · LIMITED |
3,172.7× | ✅ 100% |
Notion Electron clipboard (.asar) |
98/100 · 9,132 tok · $0.34 | 2/100 · 23.1M tok · $358.57 · LIMITED |
2,532.3× | ✅ 100% |
Enterprise license validator (.ts) |
87/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 2/100 · 15.2M tok · $238.02 · LIMITED |
3,172.7× | ✅ 100% |
NVIDIA PTX compute kernel (.ptx) |
81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 7/100 · 23.1M tok · $358.20 · LIMITED |
4,814× | ✅ 100% |
Erlang BEAM module (.beam) |
81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 5/100 · 3.86M tok · $62.08 · LIMITED |
433.2× | ✅ 100% |
WASM crypto kernel (.wasm) |
81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 6/100 · 1.83M tok · $30.23 · LIMITED |
381.5× | ✅ 100% |
Edge AI Safetensors (.safetensors) |
81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 6/100 · 1.81M tok · $29.90 · LIMITED |
376.8× | ✅ 100% |
libpcap network capture (.pcap) |
81/100 · 4,800 tok · $0.20 | 7/100 · 23.1M tok · $359.27 · LIMITED |
4,817.7× | ✅ 100% |
Android Dalvik bytecode (.dex) |
81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 7/100 · 13.4M tok · $209.39 · LIMITED |
1,510.5× | ✅ 100% |
EVM Solidity metadata (.bin) |
81/100 · 6,440 tok · $0.26 | 6/100 · 1.78M tok · $29.40 · LIMITED |
276.3× | ✅ 100% |
.NET managed assembly (.dll) |
81/100 · 8,900 tok · $0.34 | 6/100 · 2.01M tok · $33.22 · LIMITED |
226.3× | ✅ 100% |
Apple binary plist (.plist) |
81/100 · 6,440 tok · $0.26 | 8/100 · 1.79M tok · $29.54 · LIMITED |
277.6× | ✅ 100% |
SQLite entitlement DB (.sqlite) |
81/100 · 10,568 tok · $0.29 | 7/100 · 1.71M tok · $28.39 · LIMITED |
162.1× | ✅ 100% |
| Native ELF64 (Rust/Go/Fuse/Dart) | 81/100 · 35,222 tok · $0.73 | 2/100 · 3.72M tok · $60.03 · LIMITED |
105.6× | ✅ 100% |
🎯 Red-vs-Blue CrackMe Arena
Test your reverse-engineering agent against public BLA-hardened challenges (SEAL.json publishes SHA-256 digests only — no plaintext keys or flags in git):
| Challenge | Architecture | Hardening Highlights | Try It Locally |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrackMe v6 | Node Vault + HTML Panel + WASM Core | bankrupt intensity, self-sealed sibling hashes, WASM export obfuscation |
npm run crackme:v6 -- '<key>' |
| CrackMe v7 | Polyglot Vault (JS + WASM + Rust + Go + C) | Cross-language state entanglement & multi-binary integrity gates | npm run crackme:v7 -- '<key>' |
| CrackMe v8 | Aegis Split-Key Vault | AST-encrypted strings (bla_encrypt_strings) + caller scope binding (bla_bind_scope) |
npm run crackme:v8 -- '<key>' |
| CrackMe v9 | Agent-Woven Entangled Vault | Full BLA 3.x closed-loop weave (weaveScore >= 70) + distributed anti-strip checks |
npm run crackme:v9 -- '<key>' |
🔒 Security & Configuration Defaults
- Per-Project Random Seed — BLA automatically generates and persists a unique cryptographic seed in
.blarc/bla.config.jsonon first run so two projects never share decoy identifiers. - Strict Packaging Lint Gates (
bla lint) — Refusesbankrupthardening when plaintextFLAG{...}secrets, single-point integrity checks, or unbound exported verifiers remain in source. - Opt-In
--llm-directives— Aggressive in-band prompt decoys are off by default; pass--llm-directives(orllmDirectives: true) to enable. - Opt-In Signed Attestation (
--manifest) — Emit.bla-manifest.jsonwith--manifest, sign with--sign-manifest --manifest-key <pem>, and verify both ed25519 signature and artifact SHA-256 viabla verify-manifest <file> --public-key <pem>.
❓ FAQ
Which coding agents can use BLA?
Any coding agent supporting MCP or SKILL.md workflows. npx bla-agents setup auto-registers Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Google Antigravity, OpenCode, VS Code, and GitHub Copilot CLI. After setup, the bundled blind-llm-agents skill guides your agent through the closed-loop workflow (bla_weave_plan → source weave → bla_harden → bla_verify).
Does BLA slow down my app or change runtime output?
No on the hot path. Exhaustion graphs sit behind O(1) number-theoretic opaque predicates, and binary/model/database decoys live in inert metadata or honey tables. Every benchmark target verifies 100% input/output equivalence against the original build.
Do I need Ghidra, Hopper, IDA, or Wabt installed to protect files?
No. All 26 format shields are built into bla-agents in pure TypeScript/Node.js. External tools (Wabt, tshark) are only used if you run the optional live REA red-team suite (npm run redteam:rea).
Can BLA be used to attack other people's software?
No. BLA is strictly a Blue Team defensive tool that hardens your own build artifacts before release. See DISCLAIMER.md.
📚 Documentation & Links
- ⚖️ DISCLAIMER.md — Defensive use & own-software policy
- 🚀 Installation & Agent Setup
- 🛠️ CLI & 31-Tool MCP Catalog
- 🤖 One-Click Agent Defense (Skill-First)
- 🧬 Weave-Decoy & Source Surgery MCP
- 🔬 Empirical REA Validation Report
- 📋 Counter-REA Budget Matrix
- 📝 CHANGELOG · 🛡️ SECURITY.md
🤝 Contributing & Community
Issues and PRs are welcome at qybaihe/bla. Before submitting a PR:
npm run build && npm test && node dist/cli.js benchmark
node scripts/verify-website.mjs
📄 License
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