Merge pull request #224 from DeryFerd/fix/mcp-inplace-write-confirmation

fix(mcp): require confirm_overwrite before in-place encrypt-strings and bind-scope runs
This commit is contained in:
Timo Zhang
2026-11-16 23:52:34 +08:00
committed by GitHub
6 changed files with 248 additions and 20 deletions
+4 -4
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@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ Argument bounds are enforced before any tool runs: count arguments (`max_artifac
- `bla_polymorph_report`: Compare two hardened directories (`dir_a`, `dir_b`, optional thresholds) and report structural drift (export-name Jaccard, export-order Kendall-tau, byte-diff ratio, identifier overlap, aggregate `driftScore`). Drift is a stability signal, not a cracking-resistance proof. - `bla_polymorph_report`: Compare two hardened directories (`dir_a`, `dir_b`, optional thresholds) and report structural drift (export-name Jaccard, export-order Kendall-tau, byte-diff ratio, identifier overlap, aggregate `driftScore`). Drift is a stability signal, not a cracking-resistance proof.
- `bla_benchmark`: Runs the 14-target showcase benchmark suite. - `bla_benchmark`: Runs the 14-target showcase benchmark suite.
- `bla_emit_headers`: Generates C/C++, Rust, or Go defense headers (`language`, `intensity`). - `bla_emit_headers`: Generates C/C++, Rust, or Go defense headers (`language`, `intensity`).
- `bla_bind_scope`: Optional honest code-lock — write public `bind-scope.json` (domains / validFrom / validUntil) and inject `BLA_BIND_SCOPE_CHECK` into the license entry. Default OFF; never a covert backdoor. - `bla_bind_scope`: Optional honest code-lock — write public `bind-scope.json` (domains / validFrom / validUntil) and inject `BLA_BIND_SCOPE_CHECK` into the license entry. Default OFF; never a covert backdoor. In-place runs require `confirm_overwrite` (see write-safety below).
- `bla_encrypt_strings`: Encrypt sensitive literals in `panel.html` / `license.cjs` with a seed-derived XOR keystream plus a runtime decrypt stub (`path`, `seed`, optional `out_dir`, `include_urls`, `dry_run`). Raises static-grep cost only — not white-box AES. - `bla_encrypt_strings`: Encrypt sensitive literals in `panel.html` / `license.cjs` with a seed-derived XOR keystream plus a runtime decrypt stub (`path`, `seed`, optional `out_dir`, `include_urls`, `dry_run`, `confirm_overwrite`). Raises static-grep cost only — not white-box AES.
- `bla_lint_bind_scope`: Read-only lint for `bla-bind-scope/v1` (refuses non-public / hidden fields / missing runtime check). - `bla_lint_bind_scope`: Read-only lint for `bla-bind-scope/v1` (refuses non-public / hidden fields / missing runtime check).
- `bla_doctor`: Diagnostics for BLA engines and agent client registrations; also reports `skillMissingFiles` / `skillModifiedFiles` (format appendices under `references/` included). - `bla_doctor`: Diagnostics for BLA engines and agent client registrations; also reports `skillMissingFiles` / `skillModifiedFiles` (format appendices under `references/` included).
- `bla_weave_plan`: Read-only weave-decoy planner (`path`, optional `max_targets`) → `bla-weave-plan/v1` JSON (defensive theory checklist + AST `surgicalWorkorder` with `entryFunctions`, `sharedStateSlots`, `branchCandidates`, and `agentRewriteRecipe`; no crack/RE). - `bla_weave_plan`: Read-only weave-decoy planner (`path`, optional `max_targets`) → `bla-weave-plan/v1` JSON (defensive theory checklist + AST `surgicalWorkorder` with `entryFunctions`, `sharedStateSlots`, `branchCandidates`, and `agentRewriteRecipe`; no crack/RE).
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ Argument bounds are enforced before any tool runs: count arguments (`max_artifac
- `bla_harden` with `dry_run: true` (CLI `bla harden . --dry-run`) discovers targets and plans outputs with **zero bytes written** (no `.bla-hardened/`, no summary, no `.blarc` seed). Dry-run sets `overallSuccess: false` — it never claims a successful harden. - `bla_harden` with `dry_run: true` (CLI `bla harden . --dry-run`) discovers targets and plans outputs with **zero bytes written** (no `.bla-hardened/`, no summary, no `.blarc` seed). Dry-run sets `overallSuccess: false` — it never claims a successful harden.
- Discovery is capped (`max_artifacts`, default 64); when more targets exist the result sets `truncated: true` and `nextOffset` instead of silently dropping them — page with `offset` until `truncated` is false. - Discovery is capped (`max_artifacts`, default 64); when more targets exist the result sets `truncated: true` and `nextOffset` instead of silently dropping them — page with `offset` until `truncated` is false.
- `bla_harden` / `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` refuse to overwrite an existing output file unless `confirm_overwrite: true`. A refusal is `isError: true` with `{ status: "confirmation_required", wouldOverwrite: [...], wrote: [] }`; nothing is written. - `bla_harden` / `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` / `bla_encrypt_strings` / `bla_bind_scope` refuse to overwrite an existing output file unless `confirm_overwrite: true`. A refusal is `isError: true` with `{ status: "confirmation_required", wouldOverwrite: [...], wrote: [] }`; nothing is written.
- Successful `bla_harden` / `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` writes add `writeReceipt: { status: "written", wrote, overwrote, confirmed }` (`bla_harden` dry-run omits it). - Successful `bla_harden` / `bla_defend` / `bla_protect` / `bla_encrypt_strings` / `bla_bind_scope` writes add `writeReceipt: { status: "written", wrote, overwrote, confirmed }` (`bla_harden` dry-run and runs that write nothing omit it).
- `in_place: true` (MCP) / `--in-place` (CLI) plans the output as the input path; because that path already exists, `confirm_overwrite: true` is required on MCP or the call is refused with `confirmation_required`. - `in_place: true` (MCP) / `--in-place` (CLI) plans the output as the input path; because that path already exists, `confirm_overwrite: true` is required on MCP or the call is refused with `confirmation_required`.
`weave_decoys: true` activates structural Python customer-def weave (shared-slot touch + opaque-false decoy calls) after the #51 tarpit; when false, Python stays warm-init-only. JS AST weave remains always-on. `weave_decoys: true` activates structural Python customer-def weave (shared-slot touch + opaque-false decoy calls) after the #51 tarpit; when false, Python stays warm-init-only. JS AST weave remains always-on.
+70 -14
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@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ const RAW_BLA_MCP_TOOLS: readonly McpToolDefinition[] = [
{ {
name: "bla_encrypt_strings", name: "bla_encrypt_strings",
description: description:
"Encrypt sensitive string literals in panel.html / license.cjs with a seed-derived XOR keystream and inject a runtime decrypt stub. Reuses SeededPrng.derive(\"string.encrypt\") — never JS AES wrap-key (that footgun is refused by bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap). Honesty: raises static grep cost only; prove equivalence with verify / CrackMe / REA. Writes outputs (or dry_run).", "Encrypt sensitive string literals in panel.html / license.cjs with a seed-derived XOR keystream and inject a runtime decrypt stub. Reuses SeededPrng.derive(\"string.encrypt\") — never JS AES wrap-key (that footgun is refused by bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap). Honesty: raises static grep cost only; prove equivalence with verify / CrackMe / REA. Writes outputs (or dry_run); an in-place run refuses until confirm_overwrite: true.",
inputSchema: { inputSchema: {
type: "object", type: "object",
properties: { properties: {
@@ -1206,6 +1206,11 @@ const RAW_BLA_MCP_TOOLS: readonly McpToolDefinition[] = [
type: "boolean", type: "boolean",
description: "Report only; write nothing", description: "Report only; write nothing",
}, },
confirm_overwrite: {
type: "boolean",
description:
"Required when the run would rewrite an existing file in place. Re-run with true to confirm.",
},
}, },
required: ["path", "seed"], required: ["path", "seed"],
additionalProperties: false, additionalProperties: false,
@@ -1234,7 +1239,7 @@ const RAW_BLA_MCP_TOOLS: readonly McpToolDefinition[] = [
{ {
name: "bla_bind_scope", name: "bla_bind_scope",
description: description:
"Optional honest code-lock: write a PUBLIC bind-scope.json (domains + validity window) and inject a deterministic runtime check into license.cjs/entry. Default OFF. Never a covert backdoor — public:true is mandatory; hidden fields refuse. Host for Node comes from BLA_BIND_HOST (or location.hostname in browsers).", "Optional honest code-lock: write a PUBLIC bind-scope.json (domains + validity window) and inject a deterministic runtime check into license.cjs/entry. Default OFF. Never a covert backdoor — public:true is mandatory; hidden fields refuse. Host for Node comes from BLA_BIND_HOST (or location.hostname in browsers). In-place runs refuse until confirm_overwrite: true.",
inputSchema: { inputSchema: {
type: "object", type: "object",
properties: { properties: {
@@ -1268,6 +1273,11 @@ const RAW_BLA_MCP_TOOLS: readonly McpToolDefinition[] = [
type: "boolean", type: "boolean",
description: "Report only; write nothing", description: "Report only; write nothing",
}, },
confirm_overwrite: {
type: "boolean",
description:
"Required when the run would rewrite an existing entry or contract. Re-run with true to confirm.",
},
}, },
required: ["directory"], required: ["directory"],
additionalProperties: false, additionalProperties: false,
@@ -1443,6 +1453,22 @@ function writeReceipt(
return { status: "written", wrote: outputs, overwrote: overwritten, confirmed }; return { status: "written", wrote: outputs, overwrote: overwritten, confirmed };
} }
/**
* Planned write targets for `bla_bind_scope`, resolved with a zero-write
* dry run so the overwrite gate can name the exact files before anything is
* mutated. An invalid contract returns `[]` here so the real run surfaces the
* contract error instead of a misleading confirmation request.
*/
function plannedBindScopeWrites(
options: Parameters<typeof applyBindScope>[0],
): string[] {
const preview = applyBindScope({ ...options, dryRun: true });
if (preview.status === "error") return [];
return [preview.contractPath, preview.entryPath].filter(
(p): p is string => typeof p === "string" && p.length > 0,
);
}
function attachArtifactRunEvidence( function attachArtifactRunEvidence(
tool: string, tool: string,
inputPath: string, inputPath: string,
@@ -2582,7 +2608,7 @@ export async function handleMcpRequest(
refused = status === "fail" || status === "error"; refused = status === "fail" || status === "error";
} }
} else if (name === "bla_encrypt_strings") { } else if (name === "bla_encrypt_strings") {
payload = encryptStrings({ const encryptArgs = {
path: args.path as string, path: args.path as string,
seed: args.seed as string, seed: args.seed as string,
...(typeof args.out_dir === "string" && args.out_dir.trim().length > 0 ...(typeof args.out_dir === "string" && args.out_dir.trim().length > 0
@@ -2591,11 +2617,28 @@ export async function handleMcpRequest(
...(typeof args.include_urls === "boolean" ...(typeof args.include_urls === "boolean"
? { includeUrls: args.include_urls as boolean } ? { includeUrls: args.include_urls as boolean }
: {}), : {}),
dryRun: args.dry_run === true, };
}); const dryRun = args.dry_run === true;
{ const clobbered = dryRun
const status = (payload as { status: string }).status; ? []
refused = status === "error"; : existingPaths(
encryptStrings({ ...encryptArgs, dryRun: true })
.files.filter((f) => f.encryptedCount > 0)
.map((f) => f.outPath),
);
if (clobbered.length > 0 && !confirmed) {
refused = true;
payload = confirmationRequiredPayload(name, clobbered);
} else {
const report = encryptStrings({ ...encryptArgs, dryRun });
const written = report.files
.filter((f) => f.written)
.map((f) => f.outPath);
payload =
written.length > 0
? { ...report, writeReceipt: writeReceipt(written, clobbered, confirmed) }
: report;
refused = report.status === "error";
} }
} else if (name === "bla_lint_plaintext_secrets") { } else if (name === "bla_lint_plaintext_secrets") {
const allow = args.allow_plaintext_string === true; const allow = args.allow_plaintext_string === true;
@@ -2620,7 +2663,7 @@ export async function handleMcpRequest(
const domains = Array.isArray(args.domains) const domains = Array.isArray(args.domains)
? args.domains.filter((d) => typeof d === "string") ? args.domains.filter((d) => typeof d === "string")
: undefined; : undefined;
payload = applyBindScope({ const bindArgs = {
directory: args.directory as string, directory: args.directory as string,
...(domains && domains.length > 0 ? { domains } : {}), ...(domains && domains.length > 0 ? { domains } : {}),
...(typeof args.valid_from === "string" && args.valid_from.trim() ...(typeof args.valid_from === "string" && args.valid_from.trim()
@@ -2635,11 +2678,24 @@ export async function handleMcpRequest(
...(typeof args.out_dir === "string" && args.out_dir.trim() ...(typeof args.out_dir === "string" && args.out_dir.trim()
? { outDir: args.out_dir as string } ? { outDir: args.out_dir as string }
: {}), : {}),
dryRun: args.dry_run === true, };
}); const dryRun = args.dry_run === true;
{ const clobbered = dryRun
const status = (payload as { status: string }).status; ? []
refused = status === "error"; : existingPaths(plannedBindScopeWrites(bindArgs));
if (clobbered.length > 0 && !confirmed) {
refused = true;
payload = confirmationRequiredPayload(name, clobbered);
} else {
const report = applyBindScope({ ...bindArgs, dryRun });
const written = report.written
? [report.contractPath, ...(report.entryPath ? [report.entryPath] : [])]
: [];
payload =
written.length > 0
? { ...report, writeReceipt: writeReceipt(written, clobbered, confirmed) }
: report;
refused = report.status === "error";
} }
} else if (name === "bla_lint_bind_scope") { } else if (name === "bla_lint_bind_scope") {
const allow = args.allow_missing_bind_runtime === true; const allow = args.allow_missing_bind_runtime === true;
+1
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@@ -847,6 +847,7 @@ async def verify_access_policy(
arguments: { arguments: {
path: dir, path: dir,
seed: "dogfood-seed-2026", seed: "dogfood-seed-2026",
confirm_overwrite: true,
}, },
}, },
}); });
+1
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@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ describe("bind-scope (Direction-4 honest code lock)", () => {
directory: dir, directory: dir,
domains: ["mcp.example"], domains: ["mcp.example"],
valid_until: "2099-12-31T00:00:00.000Z", valid_until: "2099-12-31T00:00:00.000Z",
confirm_overwrite: true,
}, },
}, },
}); });
+2 -2
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@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ const EXPECTED_MCP_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES: ReadonlyArray<{
}, },
{ {
tool: "bla_encrypt_strings", tool: "bla_encrypt_strings",
params: ["path", "seed", "out_dir", "include_urls", "dry_run"], params: ["path", "seed", "out_dir", "include_urls", "dry_run", "confirm_overwrite"],
}, },
{ {
tool: "bla_lint_plaintext_secrets", tool: "bla_lint_plaintext_secrets",
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ const EXPECTED_MCP_ENGINE_CAPABILITIES: ReadonlyArray<{
}, },
{ {
tool: "bla_bind_scope", tool: "bla_bind_scope",
params: ["directory", "domains", "valid_from", "valid_until", "entry_path", "out_dir", "dry_run"], params: ["directory", "domains", "valid_from", "valid_until", "entry_path", "out_dir", "dry_run", "confirm_overwrite"],
}, },
{ {
tool: "bla_lint_bind_scope", tool: "bla_lint_bind_scope",
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { handleMcpRequest } from "../src/mcp/server.js";
const tempDirs: string[] = [];
afterEach(() => {
for (const d of tempDirs.splice(0)) rmSync(d, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
const SECRET_ENTRY = `module.exports.unlock = function unlock(key) {
const flag = "FLAG{mcp_gate_demo_fixture}";
const token = "7f3a9c2e1b8d4f6a0e5c9b7d3a1f8e6c";
return key === "ok" ? flag : token;
};
`;
const PLAIN_ENTRY = `"use strict";
module.exports.unlock = function unlock(key) {
return key === "ok" ? "FLAG{in_scope}" : null;
};
`;
async function call(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>) {
const res = await handleMcpRequest({
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: 1,
method: "tools/call",
params: { name, arguments: args },
});
expect(res?.error).toBeUndefined();
return res!.result as {
isError: boolean;
structuredContent: {
readonly [key: string]: unknown;
status?: string;
wouldOverwrite?: readonly string[];
writeReceipt?: Record<string, unknown>;
totalEncrypted?: number;
};
};
}
describe("MCP in-place writes require confirm_overwrite", () => {
it("bla_encrypt_strings refuses an unconfirmed in-place rewrite", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-enc-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
const file = join(dir, "license.cjs");
writeFileSync(file, SECRET_ENTRY, "utf8");
const refused = await call("bla_encrypt_strings", {
path: dir,
seed: "mcp-gate-1",
});
expect(refused.isError).toBe(true);
expect(refused.structuredContent.status).toBe("confirmation_required");
expect(refused.structuredContent.wouldOverwrite).toEqual([file]);
expect(readFileSync(file, "utf8")).toBe(SECRET_ENTRY);
});
it("bla_encrypt_strings rewrites in place once confirmed", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-enc-ok-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
const file = join(dir, "license.cjs");
writeFileSync(file, SECRET_ENTRY, "utf8");
const ok = await call("bla_encrypt_strings", {
path: dir,
seed: "mcp-gate-1",
confirm_overwrite: true,
});
expect(ok.isError).toBe(false);
expect(ok.structuredContent.status).toBe("ok");
const after = readFileSync(file, "utf8");
expect(after).not.toContain("FLAG{mcp_gate_demo_fixture}");
expect(after).not.toContain("7f3a9c2e1b8d4f6a0e5c9b7d3a1f8e6c");
expect(ok.structuredContent.writeReceipt).toEqual({
status: "written",
wrote: [file],
overwrote: [file],
confirmed: true,
});
});
it("bla_encrypt_strings dry_run never needs confirmation and writes nothing", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-enc-dry-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
const file = join(dir, "license.cjs");
writeFileSync(file, SECRET_ENTRY, "utf8");
const dry = await call("bla_encrypt_strings", {
path: dir,
seed: "mcp-gate-1",
dry_run: true,
});
expect(dry.isError).toBe(false);
expect(dry.structuredContent.status).toBe("ok");
expect(dry.structuredContent.writeReceipt).toBeUndefined();
expect(readFileSync(file, "utf8")).toBe(SECRET_ENTRY);
});
it("bla_encrypt_strings keeps out_dir runs confirmation-free when nothing is clobbered", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-enc-out-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
writeFileSync(join(dir, "license.cjs"), SECRET_ENTRY, "utf8");
const ok = await call("bla_encrypt_strings", {
path: dir,
seed: "mcp-gate-1",
out_dir: join(dir, "out"),
});
expect(ok.isError).toBe(false);
expect(ok.structuredContent.status).toBe("ok");
expect(ok.structuredContent.writeReceipt).toEqual({
status: "written",
wrote: [join(dir, "out", "license.cjs")],
overwrote: [],
confirmed: false,
});
});
it("bla_bind_scope refuses to rewrite an existing entry without confirmation", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-bind-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
const entry = join(dir, "license.cjs");
writeFileSync(entry, PLAIN_ENTRY, "utf8");
const refused = await call("bla_bind_scope", {
directory: dir,
domains: ["app.example.com"],
valid_from: "2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
valid_until: "2099-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
});
expect(refused.isError).toBe(true);
expect(refused.structuredContent.status).toBe("confirmation_required");
expect(refused.structuredContent.wouldOverwrite).toEqual([entry]);
expect(readFileSync(entry, "utf8")).toBe(PLAIN_ENTRY);
});
it("bla_bind_scope writes once confirmed", async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "bla-mcp-bind-ok-"));
tempDirs.push(dir);
const entry = join(dir, "license.cjs");
writeFileSync(entry, PLAIN_ENTRY, "utf8");
const ok = await call("bla_bind_scope", {
directory: dir,
domains: ["app.example.com"],
valid_from: "2020-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
valid_until: "2099-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
confirm_overwrite: true,
});
expect(ok.isError).toBe(false);
expect(ok.structuredContent.status).toBe("ok");
expect(readFileSync(entry, "utf8")).toContain("BLA_BIND_SCOPE_CHECK");
expect(ok.structuredContent.writeReceipt).toEqual({
status: "written",
wrote: [join(dir, "bind-scope.json"), entry],
overwrote: [entry],
confirmed: true,
});
});
});